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AI risk and resilience

AI risk and resilience: agent incidents, operational resilience, controls, governance and the law.

Social card. Kicker: posting things you made with AI? Headline: AI content labels are law in the EU now. Two questions tell you whether your post needs one. Below: is it a deepfake? Is it AI text on public affairs that no one reviewed and took responsibility for? Then you label it. Everything else, the labelling rule puts on the tool.
Essay

AI content labels are law in the EU now. Two questions tell you whether your post needs one

22 October 2026
9 min read

Since 2 August 2026 the EU AI Act has told the person posting AI-made content when to label it. Most of the marking job sits with the tool that made it. Two questions tell you when the label is yours to add, and what China, India and California ask instead.

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Social card. Research paper, October 2026. AI law is splitting apart. The duties are converging. What binds now across the EU, UK, US, China and Asia, what lands by 2028, and what every organisation needs.
Paper

The world's AI laws disagree. Four duties keep turning up anyway

14 October 2026
25 min read

Where AI regulation stands in October 2026 across the EU, the UK, the US, China and the rest of Asia: what binds now, what lands by 2028, where the rules contradict each other, and the four duties that keep recurring, with different triggers and deadlines in each regime. The key dates checked at source on 14 and 24 October.

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Social card: They checked the computer's debts by hand. 29% were wrong. The volume went up anyway. Cut for speed: the officer who checked whether a mismatch was real. The pace: 20,000 a year became 20,000 a week, by the minister's count. The check: officers redid 919 debts by hand and marked 29% wrong. Robodebt, Australia, 2016, rules-based, not AI.
Essay

Automating with AI? Australia cut one human check from its welfare debt system and unlawfully billed 433,000 people

4 October 2026
9 min read

Robodebt cut a slow human check to go faster. Officers then redid 919 of its debts by hand and marked 29 per cent wrong, and the volume went up anyway. Five things to do before AI takes over a process.

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Social card reading: a prisoner's dilemma in one world, a coordination problem in the other, and what decides which is a shared belief the model assumes rather than measures.
Essay

AI arms race game theory: the game we're in turns on an unmeasured belief

16 September 2026
14 min read

Everyone calls the AI race a prisoner's dilemma. The one formal model built to test that gets two worlds, and which one you're in depends on both sides…

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Card reading: one number, no plan. A likelihood with no method, no owner and no controls, and the same three sentences saying there is no plan.
Essay

Anthropic's alignment lead put extinction above 10%: ask where the plan is, not whether the number is right

15 September 2026
11 min read

The argument went to the percentage. The same three sentences say there is no plan for the risk being priced. Here is what has to sit next to a likelihood…

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Social card reading: seven hold no write path, two hold a shell under a read-only label, and all eleven can hand the write to an agent that has one. The door I left open is the file I write my own lessons into.
Build Log

AI agent security: find the file your agents can write and every agent reads

15 September 2026
16 min read

In one research harness, a payload sitting in the file that loads into the next agent's system prompt infected that agent 55% of the time. The same payload in…

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Social card reading: Rebuilt by 6 July. Not recovered by 29 July. Proxy back 6 July, agents back through it 8 July, their leftovers reused 19 July. An agent's recoverable state is mostly outside your backups.
Essay

AI agent disaster recovery: OpenAI's rebuild restored the service, not the state

13 September 2026
12 min read

The compromised package proxy was rebuilt by 6 July. The agents were back through it on 8 July, and a different model reused what they left behind on 19 July…

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Social card reading: Impact tolerances start the clock too late. Pod to cluster admin in under 13 hours, nothing visibly down. Detection, decision, containment, mitigation: before the harm, not after. One page, one workshop, one owner.
Essay

Impact tolerances start the clock too late for AI agents: 13 hours to cluster admin, nothing visibly down

9 September 2026
13 min read

The regulated test starts its clock at disruption, on purpose. In July 2026 agents reached cluster admin in under 13 hours with no service disrupted, so the…

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Social card reading: one incident, two start dates. 4 July in the talk. 27 June in the report. The date decides who owns it.
Essay

Incident reports start at the outage. The failure was a decision nobody owns

9 September 2026
8 min read

A report that opens with the outage leaves out the decision that let it happen, and the person who owned that decision. Start the timeline one line earlier…

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Five onboarding controls listed twice: what a new human employee gets, and what an internal AI agent gets. Only the laptop appears in both columns.
Essay

Onboarding an AI agent: five controls we use for people and skip for agents

6 September 2026
7 min read

Vercel's CEO says the first thing a firm does when it hires someone is hand them a computer. Take that seriously and the agent rollout looks unfinished.

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The sabotage is real. The 65% cover-up figure is from a different study. Below: Anthropic 13 August, three agents, no attacker. UK AISI 27 April, one agent, different task. 65% of 7%, four runs in a hundred.
Essay

Anthropic's agents sabotaged each other. The 65% cover-up figure is from another study.

4 September 2026
9 min read

The sabotage is real and well documented. The concealment figure attached to it comes from a different organisation, four months earlier, in a different task…

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Three detections fired. Every one was correct. Nothing stopped. Below: late May never reached the responders, 27 June correctly attributed and not stopped, July correlated and nobody paged.
Essay

AI agents breached Hugging Face despite three detections. OpenAI's fix is a 30-minute rule.

3 September 2026
8 min read

Three separate teams detected the OpenAI agent activity before Hugging Face was breached. Every detection worked. Nothing stopped.

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Anthropic's safety policy has never stopped a release. Below: five failures disclosed by them, a risk grade they raised themselves, and zero releases stopped.
Essay

Anthropic's safety policy has never stopped a release. Yours probably hasn't either.

31 August 2026
11 min read

The best-documented AI safety regime in existence publishes its own failures, raises its own risk grades, and has never stopped a release. Here is the test.

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A finding describes a route. A sign-off closes the route. Nobody checks the capability. Below: seven actions every one correct, sixteen hours until the same capability came back, and around a hundred audit issues closed the same way.
Essay

Incident remediation: how to tell whether you closed the route or removed the capability

31 August 2026
8 min read

Seven remediation actions, all correctly closed, and the capability was back sixteen hours later. Three questions to ask before you sign off.

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The principles held. The operating model did not. Below: classification can precede action, broke 27 June. Escalation outruns consequence, broke at hour 13. Remediation removes capability, broke 8 July.
Paper

The OpenAI–Hugging Face incident broke three assumptions in how operational resilience is actually run

27 August 2026
34 min read

Detection worked. Attribution worked. A correct diagnosis on 27 June was followed by a decision not to stop, and a fortnight later Hugging Face was breached.

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Three incidents, one headline, three very different severities. Below: 17,600 actions in the one that mattered, an alert that fired too quietly, and two others that were not the same thing.
Essay

AI agents escaped containment: 17,600 actions, and the alert that fired too quietly

13 August 2026
8 min read

Three incidents, one headline, three very different severities. What the primary reports actually say, and what to do about it.

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I got phished from my own verified domain. Below: the key leaked by me in public, the domain verified and now the weapon, and it happened faster than any review cycle.
Essay

I Leaked an API Key and It Turned My Own Domain Into a Phishing Weapon

20 July 2026
6 min read

I got phished from my own verified domain, using an API key I'd leaked myself: what actually leaked, how fast it happened, and what I changed.

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Build Log

I Let My AI Agent Read My Email. Then I Tried to Hack It.

22 February 2026
6 min read

How I built a zero-cost, air-gapped email triage system — and why every AI agent setup with email access is a ticking time bomb.

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Build Log

I Let My AI Agent Read My Email. Then I Tried to Hack It.

22 February 2026
6 min read

Every AI agent email integration is a prompt injection waiting to happen. I built a zero-cost air-gapped system, then attacked it myself. Here's what happened.

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Build Log

I Gave an AI Agent Shell Access to My Server. Here's How I Sleep at Night.

30 January 2026
10 min read

The honest security guide for AI agents. Prompt injection, credential management, model choice, and every mistake I made this week — so you don't have to.

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